Summary

This brief analysis critically examines the judgment in case C-43/24 Shipov of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).[1] The CJEU ruled that Bulgaria's refusal to allow a mobile EU citizen to change the gender entry in civil-status records was incompatible with EU law because it unjustifiably hindered free movement and interfered with protected private-life interests. The thesis supported is that with this judgment the Court exceeds the competences granted to it, violates the principles of conferred competence and subsidiarity and intervenes in the field of family law and civil status, which are the competence of the Member States. The transformation of free movement into an instrument for substantive legal interference in the sovereign domestic law of the Member States is also analyzed.

1. Introduction

The judgment in case C-43/24 Shipov[2] of the Court of Justice of the European Union represents a worrying moment in the development of European Union law. It raises questions about the limits of judicial interpretation and the role of the Court in the process of European integration. The Court held that a Member State’s refusal to allow a change in the gender recorded in civil status records could create obstacles to the exercise of the right to free movement.

2. Factual and legal framework

Herein is a summary of the facts and developments of the case. The case concerns a Bulgarian national, registered at birth as a man, who subsequently identifies and lives as a woman. The person settles in Italy, where he begins hormone therapy and builds a social life in accordance with his gender identity. The discrepancy between his appearance and official documents causes difficulties in everyday life. In 2017, a request was filed in Bulgaria to change the gender recorded, the name and the data in the civil status registers, which was rejected. This rejection then led to a number of appeals, all the way to the Supreme Court of Cassation of Bulgaria, where the issue was debated and a case was brought before the Constitutional Court (CC). The question before the CC to be determined was narrowed down by the constitutional judges to state whether sex has only a biological meaning as per the Constitution.

As a result of these procedural developments in the course of the dispute, the Supreme Court of Cassation referred the matter to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bulgaria. The latter held that according to the Bulgarian Constitution the concept of “gender” has only a biological meaning.

Based on this decision, the General Assembly of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of Cassation issued an interpretative decision, by which it accepted that the courts cannot allow a change of the gender recorded in civil status records. After issuing this interpretative decision, which is by law mandatory in the application of the matter settle by all courts, and despite it, a specific judicial panel of the Supreme Court of Cassation (SAC), examining the person’s case, sent a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union.

This summary reflects both the factual situation and the procedural development of the dispute. It also reveals, to an extent and without going into detail, the politicized nature of the subject matter – even if mandated by law, the Constitution, the decision of the Constitutional Court, and the mandatory interpretive decision of the General Assembly of the Civil Department of the Supreme Court of Cassation, one panel of activist judges from SAC decided to further extend the contention through the preliminary ruling option before the CJEU.

The case before the CJEU arose from a petition for a preliminary ruling requested by the Bulgarian Supreme Court of Cassation focusing its question to the court in Luxemburg on the compatibility of the national legal framework with EU law.[3] Bulgarian law does not provide for the possibility of changing the gender recorded in civil status registers. The Court accepted that the discrepancy between personal identity and official documents may impede the exercise of the right to free movement.[4]

3. The principle of conferred jurisdiction

According to Art. 5 of the Treaty for the European Union (TEU), the European Union acts only within the limits of the competences conferred on it.[5] Matters of family law and civil status remain within the competence of the Member States. Hence, the Shipov judgment effectively introduces an obligation to establish a legal framework on gender recognition, which constitutes an extension of the Union's competence.[6]

4. Free movement as an instrument of harmonization

The Court's reasoning is based on the link between civil status and free movement. However, the removal of obstacles to movement should not lead to the creation of substantive obligations outside the competence of the EU. Such an approach transforms free movement into a means of indirect harmonization.

What exactly is meant by “harmonization”? The phrase “free movement as an instrument of harmonization” in the context of the case before the Court of Justice of the European Union means the following: The idea is that, although the EU does not have direct competence to unify (harmonize) national law in certain sensitive areas (such as civil status and legal gender recognition), the rules on free movement of citizens in practice lead to such unification indirectly.

More specifically, in the context of the case under consideration, the following points can be listed as the logic adopted by the court in Luxemburg:

• Every EU citizen has the right to move and reside freely in countries such as Italy and Bulgaria.
• For this right to be effective, Member States must recognize certain personal legal statuses acquired in another country (e.g. name, marital status, in this case — elements of legal identity).
• If a country refuses such recognition, this impedes free movement (because the person encounters practical and legal obstacles when residing in another country).

In this case, such an obstacle is considered to be the man's insistence on being perceived by society and documented by the authorities as a woman, based on his subjective experiences. No evidence of any impediment has been presented in the case besides the inconvenience that the claimant has to explain the discrepancy between his appearance and the gender (sex) noted on his official travel documents to border police, other authorities, and hotel personnel.[7]

This is a category called "lived gender identity" (including by the Advocate General of the CJEU in the context of the decision in question). A "lived identity" is grounded not in objective or factual relations, but in an individual's subjective experience and inner sense of self, which is then treated as normatively binding on others. The perceived violation of the right of free movement is only measured by the level of psychological inconvenience for the applicant having to explain the discrepancy in some life situations between his appearance (generally typical of women) and his identity documents, which reflect his biologically established gender/sex. There are no facts about any denial of border crossings or detention as a result of said discrepancy in the complainant’s situation.

(Here also we must raise the question, which some may find to have more political and ideological overtones, as to how can a right to privacy is being elevated to a level of public policy? It is a contradiction in terms: on the one hand to accept one’s personal preference of seeing himself as the opposite gender, and on the other, to assert that strictly personal view on the rest of the public, convincing the latter that a man must be perceived and treated is if he were a woman.)

Therefore, the CJEU uses free movement as an “instrument” through which it imposes minimum requirements on national systems. In other words: there is no direct harmonization (that would be when the EU stipulates that every member state should have the same rules on gender); but in fact there is functional/indirect harmonization (“if you – a member state – do not want to violate free movement, you have to recognize certain legal situations”). That recognition of “certain legal situations” imbues into the sovereign right of each nation state to have an independent jurisdiction on matters of the family and personhood (the “citizen status” – гражданско състояние).

In the context of the case, this means that internal rules (such as those adopted in Bulgaria following national court decisions) may prove incompatible with EU law if they make the exercise of free movement practically impossible or excessively difficult. Thus, the conclusion is that the Court of Justice of the EU uses free movement as a “workaround” to approximate national legal regimes, even in areas where the EU formally has no power to harmonize them. In practice, the CJEU circumvents the law, as well as the Treaty on European Union, and imposes ideological positions on issues over which it has no jurisdiction, namely civil status, gender and family. Even this part of the already limited sovereignty of the member state has been seized through the judicial activism of the CJEU.

5. The principle of subsidiarity is violated by the CJEU

The principle of subsidiarity requires that decisions be taken at the level closest to the citizen as possible.[8] Issues of legal gender recognition are closely linked to national legal traditions and societal values. The Court does not sufficiently justify the need for intervention at the EU level, which raises doubts about compliance with this principle. The judgment at hand dismisses outright the statement of the Bulgarian government, as a sovereign and democratic expression of the will in governance of the Bulgarian people, that EU law has no precedence over member states’ regulations on family and civil status.[9]  The Treaty on European Union states in Article 4(2) that:

The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions…

As mentioned, part of the national identity of Bulgaria and its people is the long-standing legal tradition that man and woman are axiomatic existential categories that need not need definition. For example, neither the Constitution nor the Family Code contain such definitions as it has been established by logic, reason, and experience that a definition of the obvious is unnecessary. None of the modern Bulgarian constitutions, beginning with the Turnovo Constitution of 1879 has adopted any such unnecessary definitions. That constitutional and legal tradition is supplemented by the explicit mention in the current Bulgarian Constitution of role of one denomination of Christianity, the Eastern Orthodox branch, as a traditional religious confession. It is a longstanding legal and scholarly opinion that such mention is not to be regarded as an impediment to freedom of religion and the importance and practice of other beliefs. These religious, legal and societal traditions unequivocally have affirmed the obvious that man and woman are an established category with the consequential moral, practical, social, theological and existential outcomes.

These facts coupled with the lack of any evidence that the complainant in the case has faced any difficulty, besides psychological discomfort, while crossing EU borders, gives the impression that the CJEU is bent on imposing an ideological view and is “legislating from the bench” while disregarding the principles of EU law.

6. Fundamental rights and positive obligations. Judicial activism based on legal misinterpretation

The judgment is based on an expansive interpretation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law. However, there is no express obligation for Member States to establish procedures for legal gender recognition. The Court imposes a positive obligation to establish “clear and accessible” procedures⁴, which constitutes a significant extension of the scope of EU law.

Moreover, CJEU relies on fallacious precedents established by the European Court of Human Rights through a fallacious application and interpretation of Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The CJEU justifies its interpretation of “lived gender identity” as an established legal reality through the court cases before ECtHR where Art. 8 is used by that court to legislate, instead of adjudicate.[10] ECtHR has lately held that the meaning of the right to personal and family privacy has to be understood to allow for the psychological internal feelings, and possibly psychiatric conditions, in self-perception, to be acknowledged as a protected element of that right.[11] In fact, the original meaning of Art. 8 could not be further from such an opinion. It was clearly written to protect a level of privacy in one’s personal abode and interactions, as well as family relations from the intrusion of state bureaucracy and unhealthy public interest: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”

This original interpretation is clearly derived from the text of Section 1 which concerns the protection of personal and family relationships, the home and correspondence. The protection is focused on external relationships and domain. Nothing is said about internal thought life and psychological perceptions of reality.

A well-established principle of legal interpretation is to determine the original author's intent and the meaning of the text. The ECtHR's interpretation of Article 8, on which the CJEU relies in the present case, rests on the fallacy of treating a person's subjective and irrational belief about his or her gender as a legally determinative fact. By doing so, the Court departs from the original meaning of Article 8 and attributes to the Convention a purported human right that neither its text, nor its object and purpose, nor the intentions of its drafters support. Rather than interpreting the Convention, the Court effectively amends it through judicial construction.

The path to interpterion chosen amounts to legislating through the courts (or as it is popularly known “from the bench”) which is a violation of the democratic principle of separations of powers. Courts interpret and apply the law; courts do not change the meaning and purpose of the law through frivolous interpretation. However, this is what we have with the case at hand.

The CJEU's judgment repeatedly refers to the ECtHR's decisions concerning transgender issues under Article 8 as "case-law." [12]  The decisive question, however, is not whether those decisions constitute case-law in the ordinary sense, but what authority such case-law may properly exercise. Judicial precedent serves to interpret and apply an existing legal text; it does not authorize courts to create new rights that cannot be derived from the Convention's language, purpose, or drafting history. To treat precedent as an independent source of substantive rights is to transform the judicial function from one of interpretation into one of lawmaking. It is precisely this transformation that underlies the ECtHR's interpretation of Article 8 and that the CJEU adopts in the present case.

7. Interference with national law

The judgment has a direct impact on national civil status systems, implying amendment of birth certificates, adaptation of administrative registers, recognition of gender on the basis of personal preference, termed “lived identity.” These matters fall within the traditional competence of the Member States, a principle upheld by a number of provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU): Article 4(1) TFEU (non-conferred powers remain with Member States); Article 4(2) TEU (respect for national identity and constitutional structures); Article 81(3) TFEU (EU action in family law is limited to matters with cross-border implications and requires unanimity). And even if Art. 81(3) may imply interference of EU law in family and civil status in matters of cross-border issues, this does not automatically mean that EU law has precedence over national law.

European law established in other foundational documents confers sovereignty on member states regarding family, gender and civil status. Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, signed on 7 December 2000, provides: “The right to marry and the right to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights.” Civil status and gender/sex are inherently related to the right to marry and start a family.

8. Constitutional identity

According to Article 4(2) TEU, the European Union is to respect the national identities of the Member States. In this context, the judgment may give rise to a tension between EU law and national constitutional principles. It becomes clear from the judgment that CJEU dismisses the national historical, cultural and religious tradition of the Bulgarian people, and respectively the state, representing the nation. The Court effectively treats national law as an instrument for implementing the policy agenda of contemporary advocacy groups instead of interpreting it in accordance with established legal traditions, enacted legislation, and settled jurisprudence.

The Bulgarian Constitution recognizes Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the country's traditional religion. Although this recognition does not confer legal privileges upon the Orthodox Church, it reflects the constitutional acknowledgment of historical, cultural, and moral values that have shaped the nation's legal order. Those values inevitably inform Bulgarian law, including its approach to family law and civil status. The Court likewise fails to take this constitutional context into account.

9. Contesting fundamental principles of EU law

The judgment in Case C-43/24 Shipov demonstrates a tendency towards an expansion of the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union. While the objective of protecting fundamental rights, and in this case it is alleged that the right to free movement is being violated, is legitimate, the approach taken raises questions regarding the use of controversial interpretation of the law by the ECtHR. Such interpretation contests the principle of conferred powers; the principle of subsidiarity; and the balance between national sovereignty and integration in the EU legal system.

10. Contradiction with the practice of the Bulgarian supreme courts

The decision in case C-43/24 Shipov of the Court of Justice of the European Union creates significant tension with the established practice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Supreme Court of Cassation on the issues of the legal understanding of gender and the possibility of its change in civil status acts.

10.1. The cases of the Constitutional Court

With Decision No. 15 of 26.10.2021 under case No. 6/2021, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bulgaria provides a mandatory interpretation of the concept of “gender” in Bulgarian constitutional law. In its reasoning, the Court explicitly accepts: “The concept of “gender” in the Constitution should be understood in its biological sense, determined at birth.”[13]

Furthermore, it is emphasized that: “The constitutional legislator has not adopted a distinction between biological and social sex.”[14] This must be understood to mean also that biological sex determines social behavior. And further: “The law does not provide for the possibility of subjective self-determination of gender beyond its biological conditionality.”[15] These conclusions outline a clear constitutional understanding of gender as an objective and unchangeable category in the legal order. The conclusions of CC contradict directly the logic of the case-law of the ECtHR regarding the use Art. 8 of the ECHR, cited in the judgment of the CJEU, and used to elevate personal preference of gender over the established existential reality and the public interest.

In this context, the approach of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Shipov, which attaches importance to “living identity” and requires its legal recognition, is in direct conceptual contradiction with the constitutional doctrine in Bulgaria. This contradiction must be resolved in favor of the decisions of the national courts and jurisprudence as the established sovereign national order will be surrendered illegally to foreign powers and ideals only on the basis of a questionable reading of international and European law by the court. This being obvious by the two facts discussed: 1. No evidence of hindrance of movement for the complainant, besides the discomfort to explain the difference between his appearance and his identification documents; and 2. The established legal principle that EU member states may not be coerced into changing their longstanding legal, cultural, and historical traditions and identity to accommodate the “lived gender identity” of one or a disproportionately small number of individuals, must stand.

10.2. The practice of the Supreme Court of Cassation

With Interpretative Decision No. 2 of 14.03.2023 on case No. 2/2020, OSGK,[16] the Supreme Court of Cassation gives a final answer to the question of the admissibility of changing registered gender. The reasoning states: “There is no legal norm in current Bulgarian law that would allow changing the registered gender in civil status acts.”[17] The court also emphasizes the limits of the judicial function: “The court cannot, through interpretation, create a legal regulation that the legislator has not foreseen.”[18] And adds: “Changing the entries in civil status acts is admissible only in cases expressly provided for by law.”[19]

These conclusions lead to the following categorical result that courts cannot allow gender change in the absence of legal regulation. In this sense, the Shipov decision, which in practice requires the state to provide a procedure for legal recognition of gender, contradicts the established interpretation of domestic law by the Supreme Court of Cassation.

10.3. Summary of the contradiction

The comparison between the practice of the Bulgarian supreme courts and the Shipov decision reveals three main lines of conflict. Ontological understanding of gender/sex differs between the European court’s understanding and that of the Bulgarian constitutional and legal order.  The Constitutional Court has established unequivocally that gender is biologically determined. On the other hand, the CJEU had adopted the view that personal (lived) identity is also legally relevant.

Secondly, the views differ on the admissibility of legal change. The CJEU insists that there is no legal possibility to legally change one’s birth documents to the opposite gender under the current Bulgarian law; hence, the state should provide such a possibility.

Thirdly, the limits of the judicial function are being contested. The proper understanding of the CJEU’s role is that it interprets existing law rather than creates new legal institutions. In the present judgment, however, the Court departs from this function by deriving and imposing positive obligations through interpretive reasoning.

10.4. Constitutional implications

The above contradictions are not only theoretical but have direct implications for the interaction between EU law and the national legal order. These contradictions raise the question of whether and to what extent obligations arising from EU law can require change in areas that are reserved for the member state. Such areas involve the family and civil status and are subject to constitutional interpretation. Thes are matters explicitly regulated in the national legal system and are at the core of national identity within the meaning of Art. 4(2) TEU.

11. Possible consequences

If Bulgaria refuses to implement the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Shipov case there will be legal and social consequences. Infringement proceedings may be initiated by the European Commission, which may ultimately lead to financial sanctions. In addition, the individual concerned may pursue a claim for damages. This may place national courts in a direct conflict between the obligations arising under EU law and those under the Bulgarian Constitution. Non-compliance with the judgment would, in turn, expose Bulgaria to considerable institutional and political pressure within the European Union, internal political tensions and uncertainty within the judiciary.

12. How can Bulgaria defend itself in this situation?

Bulgaria can protect itself from the consequences in several ways, balancing the primacy of the national constitution and its obligations under EU law. Challenging the competence of the CJEU (ultra vires argument) – Bulgaria can continue to argue that the decision falls outside the competence of the CJEU, as the issue of gender recognition is entirely a domestic competence, regulated by the Constitution and national law. Under the law when a court exceeds its jurisdiction its judgment is null and void.

Another counter-argument to the CJEU’s reasoning is grounded in the principle of proportionality and the absence of any genuine restriction on free movement. It may be argued that the individual has not, in fact, been impeded in exercising free movement rights or accessing rights within the European Union, and that, accordingly, no interference with the right to free movement can be established.

A possible third approach is seeking to establish minimum compliance. Bulgaria can introduce limited measures to recognize the rights of the person in a cross-border context (for example when travelling or working in another Member State), without changing its domestic legislation on biological sex, thus reducing the risk of sanctions and infringement procedures. These approaches combine the protection of national sovereignty with limiting the legal and financial consequences within the EU.

13. Conclusion

In summary, the issue concerns a tension between the CJEU’s interpretation of EU law and the principle of conferral, under which competence in matters of family law and civil status remains primarily with the Member States. While EU law recognizes procedural autonomy and only limited harmonization in these fields, these constraints are intended to preserve the coherence and internal integrity of national legal systems—an equilibrium that may be disrupted by expansive judicial interpretation.

Bulgaria can defend itself by arguing that the CJEU’s decision falls outside the court’s jurisdiction because the issue of gender recognition is entirely a matter of domestic law and is regulated by the Constitution and national law; at the same time, it can argue that the person was not actually restricted in his free movement within the EU, which reduces the claim of a violation of the right to free movement; in practice, Bulgaria could introduce limited cross-border solutions that ensure minimum compliance with EU law without changing its domestic legislation on biological sex, thus protecting national sovereignty and reducing the risk of financial or legal consequences.

Ultimately, the coherence and legitimacy of the EU legal order rest on adherence to the TEU and TFEU as instruments of conferred competence and on maintaining the distinction between judicial interpretation and legislative creation. This includes ensuring the effective protection of Member State national identity under Article 4(2) TEU, especially in sensitive areas such as family law and civil status.

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Viktor Kostov, Ph.D. is a lawyer and missiologist. He is the publisher and editor-in-chief of "Freedom for All", an online and printed publication for theology and law, as well as human rights attorney in matters of protection of basic, inalienable, classical human rights. Dr. Kostov is the author of a legal opinion presented before the Constitutional Court on the above-mentioned constitutional case No. 6/21 on gender.

Keywords: Court of Justice of the EU, free movement, legal recognition of gender, family law, competence, subsidiarity.

 

[1] The text in its abridged form was first published in the Freedom for All – a Bulgarian website at www.svobodazavseki.com and in the related English language blog accessible at: www.freedomforall.eu.

[2] To add to the confusion, the judgment refers to the complainant with the name “Shipova” where adding the “a” at the end indicates a female in the Bulgarian language. I have kept the original name of the case.

[3] See Shipov v. Bulgaria, Case C-43/24, Court of Justice of the European Union (2024). The text of the judgment can be accessed online at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:62024CJ0043. Last access: June 30 2026.

[4] Ibid.

[5] The full text of the TEU can be accessed here: Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union.

[6] Treaty on European Union, Art. 5.

[7] Court of Justice of the EU. Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 12 March 2026.
K. M. H. v Obshtina Stara Zagora. Para. 42-45. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:62024CJ0043. Last access: 23 June 2026.

[8] The principle of subsidiarity is defined in Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union.

[9] Ibid, para 46.

[10] Judgment on Shipov… para. 41-42.

[11] Landmark cases in this regard are Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, (2002), Available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60596 and also I. v. the United Kingdom (2002), Available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60595; GARÇON AND NICOT v. FRANCE (2017),  Available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-172913 , etc. Accessed June 25 2026.

[12] The judgment… see para. 48-52.

[13] The case can be accessed online through the Constitutional Court’s website at: https://www.constcourt.bg/bg/case-591.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] The abbreviation stands for „Общото събрание на гражданската колегия“ translated The General Assembly of the Civil Department, in this case of the Supreme Court of Cassation.

[17] The Court’s interpretive decision quoted can be found online on the website of the court at: https://www.vks.bg/talkuvatelni-dela-osgk/vks-osgk-tdelo-2020-2-reshenie.pdf.  

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

• European Culture
• U-Turn for Europe
• National Sovereignty
• Migration
• Human Rights
• Christian Civilization

The streets of Vienna

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The speech was delivered by Dr. Viktor Kostov at the international “Conference on Values” held in Vienna by “U-Turn for Europe” in April of 2026

 

Ladies and gentlemen,

Europe today stands at a crossroads — not merely political or economic, but civilizational. We are confronting a deeper question: what sustains a civilization, and what happens when it forgets the sources of its own strength?

For centuries, Europe was shaped by two great forces: the moral vision of Christianity and the development of classical human rights. These were not accidental. They formed the backbone of Europe’s understanding of law, authority, dignity, and justice. They were lived realities that shaped laws, cultures, institutions, and the very concept of human dignity.

Yet today, many of these foundations are no longer confidently affirmed. In some cases, they are openly questioned or dismissed.

Bulgaria and the Civilizational Model of Europe

Consider Bulgaria. Founded in 681, it is one of the oldest European states to have preserved its name and identity across centuries. In the 9th century, under Boris I, Christianity was adopted as the state religion. This was not merely spiritual — it was civilizational.

The work of Cyril and Methodius and their disciples gave the Slavic world not only an alphabet, but a cultural and spiritual framework. Language, literacy, theology, and identity were woven into a durable civilizational fabric. Bulgaria aligned itself with a broader European transformation: a worldview in which law, morality, and authority were accountable to something higher than raw power.

This is what Europe once did at its best: it did not merely govern territory; it shaped cultures through meaning, education, and moral vision. Across the continent, rulers came to be seen as morally accountable. The idea that power must answer to justice became embedded in European consciousness.

This moral framework later intersected with Enlightenment thought, producing the modern language of rights, law, and human dignity that still shapes Europe today.

Read more: Europe at a Crossroads: Restoring Christianity and Classical Human Rights as Civilizational Pillars

• Council of Ministers
• Religious Freedom
• Freedom of movement in EU
• State interference in ecclesiastical matters

The building of the Council of Ministers

 

Sofia, April 1, 2026 - Thirteen Bulgarian evengelical churches and denominations are preparing to file a legal challenge before the Върховен административен съд (Supreme Administrative Court of Bulgaria) against specific provisions of newly adopted administrative Rules enacted by Order No. V-216/25.08.2025 of the Secretary General of the Council of Ministers.[1]

The challenged provisions introduce a system of prior administrative oversight over the participation of foreign religious ministers in worship and religious educational activities in Bulgaria. The Rules impose:

• requirements to justify the alleged “official necessity” of inviting a foreign religious minister;
• detailed notification obligations concerning the exact location and duration of religious activities;
• random administrative inspections of religious services;
• access by state authorities to internal registers of religious communities;
• administrative penalties for failure to comply with notification requirements;
• and the possibility of cross-border information requests regarding religious ministers.

According to the applicants, these measures go beyond statutory authority and effectively create a new legal regime through secondary legislation, without explicit parliamentary authorization.

Read more: PRESS RELEASE: 13 Religious Institutions to Challenge Bulgarian Administrative Rules Restricting...

• CPAC Hungary 2026
• Viktor Orban
• Conservative Europe

Eva Vlaardingerbroek, a Dutch political commentater, bringing hot issues to the discusion of Europe's future

 

Budapest, March 21, 2026 — CPAC Hungary 2026 brought together conservative political figures from Hungary and abroad in a highly stylized and politically charged event.[1] The conference, held just weeks before Hungary’s national elections, was marked by rally-like enthusiasm, with slogans such as “to victory” and “win baby win” setting a tone that combined traditional political discourse with elements of pop culture. The overall atmosphere underscored the high stakes for the ruling Fidesz party in the closely contested election race.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán delivered a brief and focused speech, criticizing the European Union for its excessive interference in national sovereignty. Orbán framed the upcoming elections as a decisive battle for Hungary’s independence, positioning Fidesz as the defender of democracy against external pressure from Brussels.

Read more: CPAC Hungary 2026: A Showcase of Conservative Politics and Controversy